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Abstract
Economic sanctions are a popular diplomatic tool for countries to enforce political demands abroad
or to punish non-complying countries. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether
this tool is eﬀective in reaching these goals. This paper looks at the consequences of sanctions for
bilateral trade values between 1987 and 2005. In order to quantify the direct eﬀects of sanctions on
the trade ﬂows between countries I use PPML as well as several other econometric speciﬁcations
to estimate the gravity equation with country pair, sender-time, and target-time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Following Heid et al. (2015) I include intra-national as well as international trade ﬂows, to reduce
the endogeneity bias of trade policy instruments.
The estimates reveal that there is a signiﬁcant decrease in the value of trade after the introduction
of sanctions, which turns out to be driven by moderate sanctions. I also check whether countries
that are aﬀected by sanctions switch to other trade partners, but here is no robust evidence for
behavior like this.
JEL classiﬁcation: F13, F14
Keywords: Economic Sanctions, International Trade, Panel Gravity Model, PPML
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pants of the Workshop IWB 2018 in Göttingen for valuable comments and suggestions. All errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
Economic sanctions and embargoes as an alternative to brute force are popular instruments of diplo-
matic behavior against ill-behaving states since the beginning of the 20th century, and they continue
to be popular today. After the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014,
the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), and several other states were quick to
implement sanctions against Russia. Russia, in turn, reacted by implementing multilateral trade sanc-
tions on its own, speciﬁcally, a total ban on food imports from the EU, North America, Norway and
Australia. These sanctions have been renewed and are still active today. Another prominent example
is the case of economic sanctions of the UN against North Korea, which have been increased in number
and severity numerous times as a reaction to North Korea's continuous tests of nuclear missiles. Most
recently, the USA plan to reinstate their sanctions against Iran in August 2018.
Figure 1 illustrates the number of sanctions active in a given year over the period from 1984 until 2005.
It shows that the number of active economic sanctions has remained rather steady until 1990. After
1990, their usage has grown drastically, from under 100 to over 600 in just 15 years.3
The basic idea behind sanctions as a political instrument can be summarized by a quote of US-
President Wilson from 1919: `A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply
this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It does not cost a
life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no
modern nation could resist '.
Given the prevalence of sanctions, it is a straightforward question to ask whether they are an eﬀective
tool to enforce the goal(s) of sender countries. From an anecdotal perspective, the success rate does
not seem to be overwhelming. Cuba has not abandoned its socialist regime due to pressure from the
USA, Russia has not taken any steps to undo the annexation of the Crimea, and North Korea keeps
testing missiles, to name just some examples. Especially North Korea has been subjected to drastic
sanctions from many countries across the globe for numerous years. Hufbauer et al. (2009) show that
only about one in three sanctions yields the desired political outcome.
3If unions like the EU or the Arab League are part of a sanction, the sanction is attributed to each member country
individually.
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Figure 1: Number of sanctions per year
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Source: Own calculation based on data provided by Hufbauer et al. (2009)
With President Wilson's quote in mind, how is it possible for a country to resist these sanctions? Two
explanations come to mind. First, it is possible that economic sanctions simply do not yield the desired
punishing eﬀect by not reducing existing trade between the sender and the targeted country. Secondly,
countries that are aﬀected by sanctions, either as a sender or a target, might switch their trade partners
with little costs and therefore circumvent the expected trade reduction, which potentially oﬀsets the
negative eﬀects of the sanctions mechanism.
In this essay I add to the sanctions literature by empirically evaluating these potential explanations.
In a ﬁrst step, I quantify the partial trade eﬀect of sanctions and potential counter-sanctions on
international trade by estimating a gravity equation. My preferred speciﬁcation is a pseudo poisson
maximum likelihood (PPML) panel estimation which includes zeros and intra-national trade ﬂows
and a comprehensive set of ﬁxed eﬀects. Furthermore, I use standard OLS and ﬁrst diﬀerence (FD)
regressions. I argue that the implementation of sanctions can be treated similarly to the formation of
a regional trade agreement between two countries, but with the opposite intention, of course. Instead
of abolishing tariﬀs and streamlining standards to facilitate trade, it is possible to interpret a sanction
like the introduction of an inﬁnitely high tariﬀ that prevents countries from trading speciﬁc goods or
from trading all together. Therefore, sanctions enter the trade costs function. Moreover, I test the
2
policy variables for endogeneity. The results show that the implementation of sanctions has a robust
signiﬁcant negative impact on bilateral trade between countries within the sample of around 9 percent
when using OLS and PPML but no signiﬁcant eﬀect when using FD.
Next, I diﬀerentiate sanctions by severity types. I ﬁnd that moderate sanctions are the drivers of the
negative overall impact, not extensive sanctions. Limited sanctions and extensive sanctions do not
inﬂuence trade signiﬁcantly. I repeat this analysis for yearly data instead of using three-year intervals.
The results show that the eﬀects of sanctions become a lot more volatile and their signiﬁcance depends
on the choice of standard errors. To shed some light on the eﬀectiveness of sanctions, I check for trade
diversion. The results vary with the estimation method. Using OLS I ﬁnd evidence for trade diversion
but the result is not robust to the ﬁrst diﬀerencing approach.
My data set covers the years from 1987 to 2005, making use of the Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions data base (TIES), the Direction of Trade Statistics data base (DOTS) and CEPII. To the
best of my knowledge, nobody so far has used a data set of this magnitude to answer the questions
above and has properly accounted for endogeneity, multilateral resistance, and theory consistency at
the same time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature related
to economic sanctions and trade. Section 3 introduces the sources and explains the composition of
the data set. Section 4 provides an overview regarding the empirical speciﬁcations. Then, I present
empirical results and discussions in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Several researchers have tried their hands at explaining the consequences of economic sanctions on
trade from various angles, both theoretically and empirically. I here review some of the recent empirical
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results based on the gravity framework.4
Many researchers focus on empirical eﬀects of sanctions imposed by a single country, hereafter called
"sender". Most chose the USA, since they are the most prominent user of economic sanctions as means
of foreign policy. Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) quantify the damage of US sanctions on US trade and
diﬀerentiate by severity of sanction types. The estimated negative eﬀect of implementing an extensive
sanctions in 1995 is a decrease of US exports to a sanctioned country by 99 percent and by 95 percent
for 1999, while the eﬀect of moderate and limited sanctions for the same periods is insigniﬁcant or
even slightly positive. In addition, Caruso (2003) ﬁnds a large negative impact of extensive unilateral
US sanctions against 49 target countries: on average, sanctions lead to a drop in US exports of 87
percent over the period from 1960 until 2000. Additionally, he oﬀers some evidence for positive eﬀects
of trade diversion for limited and moderate sanctions by comparing US trade with countries targeted
unilaterally by US sanctions to G-7 countries' trade with the same countries. Yang et al. (2004) group
countries together by certain characteristics, e.g., being a former part of the Soviet Union. They cover
the period from 1980 to 1998, taking 5-year intervals, and estimating each interval separately. Their
results are mixed for the eﬀects of unilateral US sanctions and their ﬁndings greatly vary with the
deﬁnition of their country samples. The authors use the EU and Japan to quantify a trade diversion
eﬀect due to US sanctions but do not ﬁnd evidence to support this claim.
Other authors, like Haidar (2016), explore the eﬀects of sanctions on a single target. He focuses
on sanctions targeting Iranian exporters between 2006 and 2011 and ﬁnds ﬁrm level evidence for
trade diversion. According to his results, two-thirds of Iranian export value has been diverted from
sanctioning to non-sanctioning countries.
The empirical results of the research mentioned above are likely to suﬀer from severe endogeneity bias.
This is mainly due because the authors did not properly control for the multilateral resistance terms
using ﬁxed eﬀects (see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)).
To shed more light on reasons for potential success or failure of economic sanctions, Early (2009) runs
4There are several authors who focus on eﬀects of economic sanctions as well, but use diﬀerent frameworks for their
analysis: Dreger et al. (2015) focus on the depreciation of the Ruble after the Western sanctions took aﬀect after the
annexation of the Crimea and the Russian counter-sanctions that followed after 2014. Using daily exchange rate data
from January 2014 to March 2015, they ﬁnd that the depreciation was mainly caused by the decrease of oil prices and
not so much due to economic sanctions of the West. Crozet and Hinz (2016) concentrate on the costs of imposing and
maintaining sanctions on Russia for the sender countries utilizing monthly country-level trade data, from December
2013 to June 2015. Using French ﬁrm-level export data, they show that after the implementation of sanctions both, the
extensive and intensive margin of exports have been strongly reduced.
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a probit estimation covering the years from 1950 to 1990. He ﬁnds that close allies of a sanctioning
country are most likely to increase trade with the target country, therefore helping to reduce the impact
of the sanction. Using multinomial logit and data on US sanctions, Early (2011) concludes that the
decision of third countries to help sanctioned countries is not driven by political but by commercial
interests.
Yang et al. (2009) compare the eﬀects of imposing sanctions on trade between the US and countries
that are targeted by US sanctions with trade between the EU and those target countries between 1980
to 2003. They report that unilateral US sanctions have a negative eﬀect on the trade value of the EU
with those target countries as well. As a potential reason, the authors suggest that extensive sanctions
imposed by the US may have a negative impact on a target country's total economic activity and trade.
Other authors have looked at the threat of sanctions and the optimal duration of sanctions. Afesorgbor
and Mahadevan (2016) provide some evidence that the mere threat of sanctions actually boosts trade
between target and sender, while imposed sanctions decrease trade. In contrast to this, Kohl and
Reesink (2016) ﬁnd no evidence that the threat of sanctions has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the value of
trade. Dizaji and van Bergeijk (2013) focus on the optimal duration of economic sanctions. For this,
they develop a theoretical model and test it empirically via vector autoregression models by using the
boycott of Iranian oil as a case study. Their key ﬁnding is that the success probability of sanctions is
higher in the short run and decreases in the long run, as the economic costs reach their peak after the
ﬁrst two years and decrease afterwards due to economic adjustment.
Hufbauer et al. (2009) give detailed information of the goals and the success or failure of economic
sanctions for the 20th century. The authors ﬁnd that only every third sanction is a success. Fur-
thermore, they suggest that policy makers should use so called "smart sanctions", which target only
speciﬁc sectors, instead of total embargoes because the success rate is higher.
3 Data
The information of the duration of sanctions and which countries are involved as senders and targets
stems from the TIES data base by Morgan et al. (2014). It contains speciﬁc records of cases of economic
sanctions, including both, their threats and impositions from 1945 until 2005. The authors diﬀeren-
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tiate between 10 types of sanctions by severity. I group these sanction types into three categories,
following Hufbauer and Oegg (2003), namely extensive, moderate, and limited sanctions. Extensive
sanctions contain total economic embargoes and blockades, e.g., those against Cuba. Partial economic
embargoes, speciﬁc import and export restrictions, and suspension of trade agreements are combined
within moderate sanctions. Finally, limited sanctions refer to travel bans, termination of foreign aid,
and asset freezes.
If a country has multiple sanction types in place, I only count the most severe. Sanctions that were
merely threatened but never actually imposed are not included within my sample; neither is information
whether sanctions ended because the goal of the sending countries was reached, or whether they were
abolished because of other political reasons. Most prior empirical research of economic sanctions make
use of the data set by Hufbauer et al. (2009). However, TIES oﬀers a signiﬁcant increase in the number
of sanction cases.
Information of free-on-board (fob) export value on the country level is provided by the direction of
trade statistics data base (DOTS) from the International Monetary Fund. To ensure theory consistent
estimators of bilateral trade policy (Dai et al., 2014) and to capture the eﬀects of globalization on
international trade (Bergstrand et al., 2015), not only international but intra-national trade is included
as well. Moreover, this allows to identify and estimate the eﬀects of non-discriminatory trade policy
(Heid et al., 2015). I compute intra-national trade values by taking the diﬀerence of each country's
gross domestic product provided by CEPII (Head et al. (2010), Head and Mayer (2014)) and the sum
of its total fob exports per year using the DOTS data.5
Gravity controls for distance, common language, colonial ties, contiguity, and trade agreements come
from CEPII (Head et al. (2010), Head and Mayer (2014)).
Following Olivero and Yotov (2012), I use three year intervals to allow trade ﬂows to adjust to changes
in trade costs. Furthermore, I want to reduce anticipation eﬀects of potential sanctions in the future.
In conclusion, the data set covers the years 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005 and the sample
size consists of around 132,497 observations of (non-singleton) country pairs. This bilateral panel data
set exceeds the data sets that have been used in the literature in time and country coverage.
5This shirt-sleeved approach is necessary because, so far, there is no information on aggregate intra-national trade
available that covers all countries within the sample. Bergstrand et al. (2015) and Yotov (2012) use this method as well.
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sanctions data set. Within the sample there is a total of
2,355 active trade agreements. 362 country pairs have a common colonial background, 4,096 share their
primary language, and 492 countries are neighbors. Aggregate trade value varies from zero to over
300 billion USD. The closest country pair in the sample is Hongkong and Macau with a geographical
distance of 60 kilometers, while the largest distance covered is from Taiwan to Paraguay.
Table 1: Summary statistics of sanctions data set
Total number of RTAs 2,355
Total number of pairs with colonial background 362
Total number of pairs with common border 492
Total number of pairs with common language 4,096
Total number of sanctions 786
Total number of limited sanctions 79
Total number of moderate sanctions 683
Total number of extensive sanctions 24
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Total trade (in mln USD) 0.00 302,195.4 256.16 2806.27
Distance (in km) 60.77 19,781.39 7,515.55 4,520.1
Duration of a sanction (in years) < 1 47 8.25 9.42
The average time span of a sanction is around 8 years, but the duration varies greatly. Some only
last several months, while others last up to 47 years. An example for the latter are India's sanctions
against South Africa during the Apartheid.
More than 780 country pairs are aﬀected by sanctions at least in one year over the observed period
from 1987 to 2005. If sanctions are grouped due to their severity, there is a total of 24 severe, 683
moderate, and 79 limited sanctions.
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4 Estimation strategy
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation of the gravity equation which is estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects OLS (FE) is given
below:
ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k + ρINTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ϑij + ij,t. (1)
Here, Xij,t denotes the value of exports of sender i to target j in year t. The sanction-dummy SANCij,t
takes the value of 1 if country j is the target of an active sanction by country i in year t, and zero
otherwise.
In order to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of diﬀerent severity types of sanctions I classify them by groups
(Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003). Furthermore, I include a dummy that captures active RTAs, RTAij,t,
together with 3-, 6- and 9-year lags. This is done to allow for time-varying or non-linear eﬀects
of RTAs. INTL_BRDRij,t is a dummy that captures globalization eﬀects such as technology and
innovation (Bergstrand et al., 2015). It takes the value of 1 if international trade occurs, and zero
otherwise. Because of perfect collinearity with the other ﬁxed eﬀects, the border dummy for the most
recent year in the sample is dropped from the estimation.
It is possible, that shocks hit only the importer or the exporter in a given year, such as potential changes
in legislature after an election within a country that could either be a boost or a hindrance to trade. To
account for these multilateral resistance terms, speciﬁcation (1) includes exporter-year and importer-
year ﬁxed eﬀects denoted by µi,t and λj,t, respectively. Unobserved pair-speciﬁc characteristics aﬀect
trade ﬂows, too (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). To account for this, the pair ﬁxed eﬀect ϑij is included.
Because of perfect collinearity, ϑij captures all time-invariant country pair speciﬁc inﬂuences on trade,
both, observable and unobservable. The drawback is that it is not possible to quantify, e.g., the eﬀect
of common language on the value of trade. The trade eﬀects of time-varying variables, like sanctions,
can still be identiﬁed.
An alternative way to control for unobserved pair-speciﬁc heterogeneity is diﬀering the data (FD),
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which is done in speciﬁcation (2). It yields a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator that measures the
changes on trade value if and when a country pair implements sanctions (and stops them again). The
drawback is that observations are lost, if trade ﬂows are not observed in one of the years.
∆ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t∆ +
3∑
k=0
βt−k∆RTAij,t−k + ρ∆INTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ∆ij,t. (2)
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, however, all three speciﬁcations above are potentially biased and
inconsistent due to the logarithmic form of the gravity model. The PPML approach proposed by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) performs well under these circumstances, since it makes use of the
multiplicative form of the gravity model. Another major advantage of the PPML method is that it
allows to incorporate country pairs with zero trade ﬂows without any manipulation of the data. Zero
trade ﬂows mostly occur for small countries. Since these countries are often the targets of sanctions,
it could potentially bias the results if they are left out. This is why speciﬁcation (3) given below is the
preferred speciﬁcation.
Xij,t = exp
[
β1SANCij,t +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k + ρINTL_BRDRij,t
+ µi,t + λj,t + ϑij
]
∗ ij,t (3)
The explanatory variables are the same as in speciﬁcation (1), as are the ﬁxed eﬀects.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the empirical estimations. In the ﬁrst subsection, I show and discuss
partial trade destruction eﬀects. In the second subsection, I aim to capture trade diversion eﬀects.
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5.1 Trade destruction
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the diﬀerent gravity speciﬁcations (1) to (3). For the sake of
readability, only the explanatory variable of interest is shown.6 All speciﬁcations include sender-year
and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional controls include RTAs together with 3-, 6-, and 9-year lags and
an indicator for the occurrence of international trade. In addition, speciﬁcations (1) and (3) include
trade pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country-pair level, as it is
common in the literature. However, in a panel gravity context, there are several other dimensions in
which the errors may be correlated: at the sender, target, year, sender-year, target-year, and country-
pair level, respectively (Cameron et al., 2011). Therefore, I report standard errors that are clustered
at these six dimensions (multi-way) for the variables of interest as well, following Egger and Tarlea
(2015). This clustering inﬂuences the size of the standard errors, and therefore, the level of signiﬁcance
of the reported coeﬃcients.7 I report the within-R2 for the FE and FD regressions and follow the
method described by Tenreyro for the PPML R2 by computing the square of the correlation between
trade and ﬁtted values.8
Table 2: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: FE FD
PPML with
FE sample
PPML with
full sample
Sanctions -0.074 0.003 -0.085 -0.086
(0.033)** (0.034) (0.039)** (0.038)**
[0.037]** [0.035] [0.050]* [0.050]*
{0.060} {0.047} {0.062} {0.064}
N 93828 70826 93828 132497
within R2 0.0019 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no yes yes
LHS variable columns (1) & (2): ln(export value), columns (3) & (4):
export value. All estimations include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs, RTA lags, and
international trade. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at
country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The result of the FE estimation in column (1) shows that sanctions have a negative eﬀect on the value
of trade, on average of -7.1 percent (= 100[e−0.074 − 1]). The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level.
6For tables with the full list of covariates, please see the Appendix
7If not speciﬁed otherwise, levels of signiﬁcance are based on country-pair clustered errors.
8See her homepage for details, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/tenreyro/LGW.html
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Column (2) shows the result for the FD approach instead of pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Since the ﬁrst period
is lost due to the estimation process, the sample size is smaller. The implementation of sanctions now
seems to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on trade.
In the last two columns the results of the preferred estimation method using PPML are presented. To
show the diﬀerence between the FE and PPML estimators, column (3) shows the estimation results
using the same sample size as the FE of column (1), covering only positive trade ﬂows. At the 10
percent level of signiﬁcance, the coeﬃcient predicts an average decrease of -8.1 percent on the value
of bilateral trade if sanctions are implemented. Finally, the last column makes use of the full sample
including zero trade ﬂows. The negative eﬀect of sanctions on trade is -8.2 percent. This -8.2 percent
decrease translates to a reduction of exports from the EU to Russia of about 12.9 billion USD due
to active sanctions for 2016. The results of the preferred PPML estimation approaches in column (4)
appear to be robust and are close to the FE result from column (1), even though the sample size diﬀers
by over 38,000 observations.
A big issue when estimating trade policy is the endogeneity of its implementation. It is not a far
stretch to believe that countries are potentially reluctant to implement extensive sanctions against
important trading partners but may be less so in implementing limited or moderate ones. A similar
line of reasoning may hold true for RTAs. Country pair ﬁxed eﬀects or using the ﬁrst diﬀerence should
take care of this issue. To test whether strict exogeneity of the trade policy variables can be assumed,
future leads are included within the preferred estimation speciﬁcation (3) following Wooldridge (2010).
Table 3 shows the results. Both, the future lead for RTAs as well as the future lead for sanctions are
returned close to zero and insigniﬁcant when standard errors are clustered at country pairs or multi-
way, allowing for the interpretation that future formation of trade agreements or future implementation
of sanctions have no inﬂuence on the value of trade in the current period. These ﬁndings support the
claim that there is no anticipation eﬀect.
Table 4 oﬀers new insights into the composition of the sanctions eﬀect from Table 2. Here, I diﬀerentiate
between the three types of sanctions, limited, moderate, and extensive, respectively. Each type is
estimated individually in the columns (1) to (3) and they are estimated together in column (4). The
estimation methods are the same as in Table 2. As additional controls all estimations include RTA
dummies, 3-, 6-, and 9-year lags and dummies for international trade. In addition, all speciﬁcations
include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Except for the FD approach all estimations include
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Table 3: Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation
(1) (2)
Estimation method: PPML
RTA 0.337 0.347
(0.034)*** (0.034)***
[0.046]*** [0.048]***
{0.052}*** {0.066}***
RTA lead -0.035
(0.021)*
[0.032]
{0.080}
Sanctions -0.088 -0.080
(0.038)** (0.042)*
[0.051]* [0.052]*
{0.069} {0.069}
Sanctions lead 0.037
(0.032)
[0.041]
{0.060}
N 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes
LHS for estimation methods: export value. Gravity controls include dummies for
international trade. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year, and
country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. The lead is three years. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Trade eﬀects of economics sanctions by severity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Estimation method: FE
Limited sanctions -0.057 -0.057
(0.146) (0.145)
[0.156] (0.156)
{0.140} {0.141}
Moderate sanctions -0.086 -0.086
(0.034)** (0.034)**
[0.037]* [0.037]**
{0.058} {0.060}
Extensive sanctions 0.312 0.312
(0.336) (0.336)
[0.359] [0.359]
{0.182} {0.183}
N 93828 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
Panel B Estimation method: FD
Limited sanctions -0.043 -0.043
(0.139) (0.139)
[0.143] (0.143)
{0.075} {0.075}
Moderate sanctions 0.005 -0.005
(0.035) (0.035)**
[0.035] [0.035]*
{0.047} {0.047}
Extensive sanctions 0.074 -0.074
(0.296) (0.296)
[0.310] [0.310]
{0.220} {0.220}
N 70826 70826 70826 70826
R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Panel C.1 Estimation method: PPML
(with FE sample)
Limited sanctions -0.011 -0.020
(0.057) (0.055)
[0.057] (0.053)
{0.039} {0.039}
Moderate sanctions -0.084 -0.084
(0.038)** (0.038)**
[0.050]* [0.0510*
{0.061} {0.063}
Extensive sanctions -0.458 -0.452
(0.316) (0.315)
[0.388] [0.387]
{0.501} {0.500}
N 93828 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Panel C.2 Estimation method: PPML
(with full sample)
Limited sanctions -0.021 -0.030
(0.056) (0.057)
[0.063] (0.058)
{0.032} {0.037}
Moderate sanctions -0.086 -0.086
(0.038)** (0.038)**
[0.051]* [0.051]*
{0.063} {0.074}
Extensive sanctions -0.212 -0.212
(0.309) (0.399)
[0.400] [0.399]
{0.181} {0.186}
N 132497 132497 132497 132497
within R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes
LHS for panel (A) & (B): ln(export value), for panel (C.1) & (C.2): export value
Gravity controls include RTA, RTA lags, and a dummy for international trade.
All estimation methods include sender-year and target-year ﬁxed eﬀects, methods
1, 3, & 4 include pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects as well.
Panel A provides results for the FE speciﬁcation (1). The coeﬃcient for limited sanctions is negative
but does not signiﬁcantly eﬀect trade which makes economic sense, as limited sanctions do not target
trade but individuals via travel bans and ﬁnancial asset freezes. The coeﬃcient for moderate sanctions
predicts a decline of -8.2 percent on average for the value of trade, which is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. The eﬀect of extensive sanctions seems to be positive and insigniﬁcant. This result does not
change, whether sanctions are included individually or together.
A diﬀerent picture can be seen estimating it with FD in panel B. Like in Table 2, the FD approach leads
to insigniﬁcant results for all three variables of interest, if they are estimated individually. Limited
sanctions are negative, moderate sanctions are close to zero, and the coeﬃcient for extensive sanctions
is positive. However, if all three sanction types are estimated together, the coeﬃcient for moderate
sanctions returns with -0.005 and slightly signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
The preferred PPML speciﬁcation is ﬁrst estimated in panel C.1 using the FE sample with positive
trade ﬂows to make it comparable with the regression from panel A. The introduction of moderate
sanctions dampens trade by -8.1 percent. The eﬀect of limited sanctions coeﬃcient is again negative
but insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for extensive sanctions is now negative and fairly large, but remains
insigniﬁcant. The results remain the same, if all three sanctions dummies are included together.
Panel C.2 of the table utilizes the full sample and predicts that moderate sanctions reduce trade by
-8.2 percent. In contrast to the previous PPML, the negative eﬀect of limited sanctions increases, while
the coeﬃcient of extensive sanctions decreases. However, both remain insigniﬁcant.
The overall negative eﬀect of sanctions seems to be driven solely by moderate sanctions within the
sample. Apart from the FD approach, the coeﬃcient remains fairly robust across all speciﬁcations.
Furthermore, it makes no diﬀerence for the eﬀects of diﬀerent sanction types on trade, whether they
are included individually or together in the regression.
On the ﬁrst glance, it is puzzling that extensive sanctions play no signiﬁcant role on the value of trade
across all speciﬁcations. This counter-intuitive result may stem from the fact that these sanctions are
mostly between countries that did not trade a lot with each other to begin with, like Syria and Israel.
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Moreover, the number of extensive sanctions in the overall sample is very small and there is not a lot
of variation within the observed time period.
These ﬁndings are quite diﬀerent from previous results from the literature, where the main driver of
the negative impact on trade stems from extensive sanctions. This change in results may be due to
moving away from single sender or target countries and the resulting increase of the sample size and/or
due to omitted variable bias in previous empirical studies.
Table 5: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation (annual data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method: PPML
Sanctions -0.055
(0.020)***
[0.037]
{0.042}
Lim. sanctions -0.116 -0.132
(0.049)** (0.054)**
[0.062]* [0.068]*
{0.060}* {0.064}**
Mod. sanctions -0.054 -0.054
(0.021)*** (0.021)***
[0.038] [0.038]
{0.042} {0.050}
Ext. sanctions -0.216 -0.218
(0.154) (0.156)
[0.314] [0.314]
{0.131}* {0.128}*
N 379425 379425 379425 379425 379425
R2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
Gravity controls yes yes yes yes yes
LHS variable: export value. Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs, RTA lags, and
for international trade. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year, and country
country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country
pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
It is possible that some sanctions began and ended between two three-year intervals. To capture those,
I use yearly data instead of intervals in Table 5. This increases the number of observations from around
133,000 to nearly 380,000. In the ﬁrst column, the general sanctions dummy is used. In columns (2)
to (4) I distinguish once again by severity type and in column (5) I use the three types together
as explanatory variables. All estimations include sender-year, target-year, and pair ﬁxed eﬀects. As
additional controls, dummies for RTAs and international trade are added.
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In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, sanctions have a negative impact on the value of exports by around -5.3
percent. This eﬀect is only signiﬁcant when using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
The average eﬀect of limited sanctions presented in column 2 is given by a coeﬃcient of -0.116 and is
signiﬁcant at 5 percent with robust standard errors. This eﬀect remains statistically signiﬁcant at 10
percent when clustering at country pair level and multi-way. An implementation of moderate sanctions
decreases the trade value by -5.4 percent. This result is highly signiﬁcant with robust standard errors
and insigniﬁcant otherwise.
In the fourth column it can be shown that extensive sanctions decrease trade by around 19 percent
but are they only statistically signiﬁcant from zero at 10 percent when choosing multi-way clustering.
In column (5), the three severity types are once again estimated together. Like in Table 4, the results
do not change and remain very robust.
The yearly eﬀects of sanctions from Table 5 are a lot more volatile than the previous ones and their
signiﬁcance strongly depends on the choice of standard errors. The only persistent negative eﬀect of
sanctions stems from the implementation of limited sanctions. This seems counter-intuitive at ﬁrst but
it is possible that moderate and extensive sanctions can somewhat be anticipated, while travel bans
and asset freezes may happen unexpectedly.
Another potential reason for the overall decrease in signiﬁcance is that the data set grew in size nearly
three times when using yearly data instead of intervals but the number of sanctions did not even
double. This may reduce the overall impact of sanctions in this sample.
5.2 Trade diversion
In this subsection, I check for evidence of trade diversion after the imposition of a sanction within the
sample. In analogy to Magee (2008) who focuses on trade diversion induced by RTAs, I capture trade
diversion by means of a dummy variable. The dummy is equal to unity if either of the two countries
is aﬀected by an active sanction in year t, either as sender or as target. The dummy is zero, if i is the
sender and j is the target of a sanction at time t and it is zero, if neither country is directly aﬀected
by a sanction. This means that trade diversion is deﬁned in such a way that it only takes a positive
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value if active sanctions inﬂuence one of both trade partners. Hence, the variable is not bilateral in
nature but monadic. If trade diversion takes place I expect to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient that can oﬀset
the negative eﬀect of a sanction. This would translate into a switch in trade away from a partner that
is involved in sanctions toward one or more that are not.
In order to check for trade diversion, it is no longer possible to make use of the preferred PPML
speciﬁcation (3) because the trade diversion dummy would be subsumed by either the sender-time or
target-time ﬁxed eﬀect. I use FE and FD for the estimation. The respective equations are given below:
ln(Xij,t) = β1SANCij,t + β2TDit + β3TDjt +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k
+ ρINTL_BRDRij,t + γMLRTijt + ϑij + δi + δj + κt + ij,t (4)
and
∆ln(Xij,t) = β1∆SANCij,t + β2∆TDit + β3∆TDjt +
3∑
k=0
βt−kRTAij,t−k
+ ρ∆INTL_BRDRij,t + γ∆MLRTijt + κt + ij,t (5)
Since both, sender and targets of sanctions, can potentially divert their trade I include measures for
both, TDit and TDjt, respectively. The explanatory variables are the same as in speciﬁcation (1) but,
instead of the country year ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects κt, sender ﬁxed eﬀects δi, and target ﬁxed
eﬀects δj , are included. Diﬀerencing again takes care of all time invariant ﬁxed eﬀects, therefore only
the year ﬁxed eﬀect, κt, remains in the second equation.
To correct for the omission of country year ﬁxed eﬀects and, therefore, the omission of measures of
prices, I follow the methodology of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and use their measure to model country
i's multilateral resistance to export and country j's multilateral resistance to import. MRDISTij,t
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yields the multilateral resistance for bilateral distance between country pair ij at year t:
MRDISTij,t =
[(
N∑
k=1
θk,tDISTik
)
+
(
N∑
m=1
θm,tlnDISTmj
)
−
(
N∑
k=1
N∑
m=1
θk,tθm,tlnDISTkm
)]
, (6)
with θl,t =
GDPl,t∑N
l GDPl,t
, l ∈ k,m.
The coeﬃcients for the multilateral resistance terms for border crossings of trade, RTAs, contiguity,
and common language over time are deﬁned similarly.
Table 6: Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2)
Estimation method: FE FD
Sanction 0.078 -0.065
(0.033)** (0.037)*
[0.038]** [0.039]*
{0.122} {0.216}
Trade diversion
of target
0.003 -0.004
(0.002)* (0.002)*
[0.002]* [0.002]*
{0.007} {0.005}
Trade diversion
of sender
0.006 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)
[0.002]*** [0.002]
{0.006} {0.005}
N 93869 70867
within R2 0.0052 0.0005
Gravity controls yes yes
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
Year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Sender, target ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
LHS variable: ln(export value). Gravity controls include dummies for RTAs,
RTA lags, international trade, and controls for multilateral resistance following
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The ﬁndings of both estimations are combined in Table 6, which once again only reports the variables
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of interest. The result for the FE regression in column (1) would imply that sanctions seem to have
a positive impact on exports to sanctioned countries. Trade diversion seems to take place within the
sample. In the presence of a sanction, trade to other countries rises on average by 0.6 percent for the
sending country. Target countries seem to be able to divert 0.3 percent of their trade successfully. The
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively.
The coeﬃcients for trade diversion are positive and somewhat signiﬁcant, but the point estimates are
fairly small. A potential explanation is that countries that are inﬂuenced by sanctions, either as senders
or as targets, split their lost trade across multiple new partners. If each of these new partners absorbs
only a fraction of the total loss due to a sanction, then the changes could vanish in the aggregated
value of exports.
The positive eﬀect of trade diversion for the sending countries is twice the size of the one for target
countries. This makes sense, because sending countries know about the implementation of sanctions
and are able to think about potential new partners beforehand. The positive coeﬃcient could also be a
possible explanation, why some countries are very quick to implement sanctions. If the implementation
of sanctions does not hurt the value of overall trade of a sending country, policy makers may not care
too much whether the goal of the sanction is actually possible.
The positive eﬀect of sanctions is puzzling and counter-intuitive. It is possible that the explanatory
variables do not control for multilateral resistance as well as country-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, the
presence of heteroscedasticity potentially aﬀects both estimators. This may bias the results.
Using FD, the negative direct eﬀect of sanctions re-emerges. Moreover, exports to targeted countries
seem to fall. This lends support to the hypothesis that other countries reduce exports to a targeted
country as well, without formally imposing a sanction (Early, 2009). Exports of sender countries to
other countries do not seem to be aﬀected. This could mean that senders only impose sanctions on
targets that are not too important for their exports.
The FD-approach performs better with respect to the credibility of the sanctions dummy. The coeﬃ-
cient returns with -6.5 and is close to the estimated results in Tables 2 and 4. A possible interpretation
for the negative coeﬃcient for target trade diversion could be that countries that do not actively impose
sanctions show solidarity with the sender and, as a consequence, additionally divert trade away from
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the target. However, this approach most likely suﬀers from the same potential endogeneity problems
as the FE.
In conclusion, the results are very volatile and depend strongly on the choice of the estimation method.
Furthermore, since multilateral resistance is not controlled for by country-year ﬁxed eﬀects, it is possible
that the results suﬀer from omitted variable bias. Finally, the preferred PPML method can not be
applied as a robustness test with a data set of this magnitude (yet). Therefore, the results have to be
treated with caution.
6 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this essay was to quantify partial trade eﬀect of sanctions on exports using a modern
estimation technique and to test its robustness against several econometric speciﬁcations commonly
used in the literature. In contrast to previous research, the sample size is increased and it includes
multiple senders and targets of sanctions. Furthermore, it sheds some light on the question if trade
sanctions are potentially oﬀset by the occurrence of trade diversion. For this, information containing
bilateral international and intra-national trade values has been merged with gravity controls and with
data regarding the imposition- and end-year as well as the severity of occurring economic sanctions
between country pairs.
The evidence presented in the previous section shows that, indeed, trade sanctions have a signiﬁcant
and robust negative impact on the value of trade of around -8 percent when using FE and PPML
across three-year intervals. If sanctions are grouped according to severity, it can be seen that the size
of the negative impact is mostly due to moderate sanctions, which speciﬁcally target single sectors.
The implementation of limited sanctions does not seem inﬂuence trade at all within the sample. The
same holds true for extensive sanctions, which are the main drivers in related literature.
When applying yearly data, the coeﬃcient of limited sanctions remains statistically signiﬁcant and
predicts a decrease of trade due to sanctions of around -11 percent. The signiﬁcance of other speciﬁ-
cations depends on the choice of standard errors. It is possible that there is an anticipation eﬀect for
moderate and extensive sanctions, but not for limited sanctions. Another possible reason is that the
yearly data set includes too few active sanctions relative to the overall sample to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
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trade.
The evidence for trade diversion is volatile within the sample and depends on the estimation method. If
using FE, sanction-sending countries are able to divert trade away from sanctioned partners, increasing
average trade value on average by around 0.06 percent. Target countries experience a positive impact
of trade diversion on average trade by 0.04 percent. In addition, the coeﬃcients predict that sanctions
have a positive eﬀect on trade.
With the FD-approach, the sanctions dummy is negative and there is no evidence for trade diversion
regarding countries that are senders of economic sanctions. However, there appears to be a negative
eﬀect of trade diversion for targets of sanctions.
For future research it would be interesting to include year-sanction interactions into the estimations
to see if diﬀerent types of sanctions behave diﬀerently over time in order to ﬁnd the optimal duration
of a sanction.
New insights regarding the eﬀect of trade diversion could come from applying a two-step estimation
strategy that could allow to estimate trade diversion using PPML. Moreover, it would be interesting
to analyze the eﬀects of sanctions on sectoral trade, because sanctions typically focus on particular
sectors. This would require more detailed information about sanctions, which is not available at the
moment.
21
References
Afesorgbor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality
of Target States. World Development , 83 , 111.
Anderson, J. E., & Van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle.
American Economic Review , 93 (1), 170192.
Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2007). Do free trade agreements actually increase members'
international trade? Journal of International Economics, 71 (1), 7295.
Baier, S. L., & Bergstrand, J. H. (2009). Bonus vetus OLS: A simple method for approximating
international trade-cost eﬀects using the gravity equation. Journal of International Economics,
77 (1), 7785.
Bergstrand, J. H., Larch, M., & Yotov, Y. V. (2015). Economic Integration Agreements, Border Eﬀects
and Distance Elasticities in Gravity Equation. European Economic Review , 78 , 307327.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011). Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering.
Journal of Business & Economics Statistics, 29 (2), 238249.
Caruso, R. (2003). The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis.
Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy , 9 (2), 134.
Crozet, M., & Hinz, J. (2016). Collateral Damage: The Impact of the Russia Sanctions on Sanctioning
Countries' Exports.
Dai, M., Yotov, Y. V., & Zylkin, T. (2014). On the trade-diversion eﬀects of free trade agreements.
Economics Letters, 122 (2), 321325.
Dizaji, S. F., & van Bergeijk, P. a. G. (2013). Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of
economic sanctions: A VAR approach with an application to Iran. Journal of Peace Research,
50 (6), 721736.
Dreger, C., Fidrmuc, J., Khodolin, K., & Ulbrucht, D. (2015). The Ruble between the hammer and the
anvil : Oil prices and economic sanctions Institute for Economies in Transition.
22
Early, B. R. (2009). Sleeping With Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting
Trade. International Studies Quarterly , 53 (1), 4971.
Early, B. R. (2011). Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Eﬀects on the Success
of Economic Sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7 , 381402.
Egger, P. H., & Tarlea, F. (2015). Multi-way clustering estimation of standard errors in gravity models.
Economics Letters, 134 , 144147.
Feenstra, R. C., & Romalis, J. (2014). International prices and endogenous quality. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 129 (2), 477527.
Haidar, J. I. (2016). Sanctions and Export Deﬂection: Evidence from Iran Sanctions and Export
Deection: Evidence from Iran. Amsterdam.
Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2014). Gravity Equations: Toolkit, Cookbook, Workhorse. In G. Gopinath,
E. Helpman, & K. Rogoﬀ (Eds.), Handbook of international economics (4th ed., chap. 3). Ams-
terdam: Elsevier.
Head, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2010). The erosion of colonial trade linkages after independence.
Journal of International Economics, 81 (1), 114.
Heid, B., Larch, M., & Yotov, Y. V. (2015). A Simple Method to Estimate the Eﬀects of Non-
discriminatory Trade Policy within Structural Gravity Models. Manuscript .
Hufbauer, G., Schott, J., Elliott, K., & Oegg, B. (2009). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.).
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for Internatioal Economics.
Hufbauer, G. C., & Oegg, B. (2003). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on US Trade: Andrew Rose's
Gravity Model. Peterson Institute for International Economics(Policy Briefs PB03-04).
Kohl, T., & Reesink, C. K. (2016). Sticks and Stones : (Threatening to Impose) Economic Sanctions
and their Eﬀect on International Trade.
Magee, C. S. P. (2008). New measures of trade creation and trade diversion. Journal of International
Economics, 75 (2), 349362.
23
Magee, C. S. P. (2016). Trade creation, trade diversion, and the general equilibrium eﬀects of regional
trade agreements: a study of the European Community-Turkey customs union. Review of World
Economics, 152 (2), 383399.
Morgan, T., Bapat, N. A., & Krustev, V. (2013). Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data
4.0 Users' manual Case Level Data. , 113.
Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions
1945-2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conﬂict Management and Peace Science, 31 (5), 118.
Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N. A., & Krustev, V. (2009). The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions,
1971-2000. Conﬂict Management and Peace Science, 26(I), 92110.
Olivero, M. P., & Yotov, Y. V. (2012). Dynamic gravity: Endogenous country size and asset accumu-
lation. Canadian Journal of Economics, 45 (1), 6492.
Oprunenco, A. (2011). The Impact of the Russian Wine Embargo: Estimation of the Economic Impact.
Expert Group Centru Analitic Independent , February , 122.
Santos Silva, J. M. C., & Tenreyro, S. (2006). The Log of Gravity. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 88:4 , 641658.
Torbat, A. E. (2005). Impacts of the US trade and ﬁnancial sanctions on Iran. World Economy , 28 (3),
407434.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2nd ed.). Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
Yang, J., Askari, H., Forrer, J., & Teegen, H. (2004). U.S. Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Study.
The International Trade Journal , 18 (1), 2362.
Yang, J., Askari, H., Forrer, J., & Zhu, L. (2009). How do US economic sanctions aﬀect EU's trade
with target countries? World Economy , 32 (8), 12231244.
Yotov, Y. V. (2012). A simple solution to the distance puzzle in international trade. Economics
Letters, 117 (3), 794798.
24
Yotov, Y. V., Piermartini, R., Monteiro, J.-A., & Larch, M. (2016). An Advanced Guide to Trade
Policy Analysis : The Structural Gravity Model. UNCTAD/WTO.
25
A Appendix
In the following, all estimation tables are presented with all explanatory variables, except for the
ﬁxed eﬀects dummies. INT_BRDR captures the eﬀect of globalization by being 1 if trade across
state borders takes place and zero otherwise. CLNY represents the colony dummy, LANG common
language between country pairs, DIST bilateral distance, and CNTG contiguity. To account for
multilateral resistance, all explanatory variables in Table A.8 except for sanction and trade diversion
are transformed following Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and are given by mrdis, mrborder, mrrta,
mrcntg, mrlang, and mrclny.
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Table A.1: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method: FE FD
PPML with
FE sample
PPML with
full sample
Sanctions -0.074 0.003 -0.085 -0.086
(0.033)** (0.034) (0.039)** (0.038)**
[0.037]** [0.035] [0.050]* [0.050]*
{0.060} {0.047} {0.062} {0.064}
RTA 0.212*** 0.052 0.253*** 0.270***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.053) (0.053)
RTA_LAG3 0.038 0.030 0.132*** 0.133***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.203*** 0.164*** 0.029 0.030
(0.037) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
RTA_LAG9 0.130*** 0.018 -0.027 -0.033
(0.038) (0.038 (0.028) (0.028)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.424*** -0.727*** -0.398*** -0.411***
(0.125) (0.140) (0.043) (0.045)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.437*** -0.647*** -0.400*** -0.409***
(0.106) (0.117) (0.043) (0.044)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.400*** -0.554*** -0.479*** -0.491***
(0.092) (0.099) (0.035) (0.036)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.281*** -0.367*** -0.330*** -0.332***
(0.081) (0.086) (0.030) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.262*** -0.311*** -0.219*** -0.222***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.028) (0.028)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.155*** -0.189*** -0.158*** -0.160***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.016) (0.016)
N 93828 70826 93828 132497
within R2 0.0019 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no yes yes
Sender-year, target-year
ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
LHS variable columns (1) & (2): ln(export value), columns (3) & (4): export value
Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way
clustered, respectively. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.2: Test for exogeneity of policy variables: PPML estimation
(1) (2)
Estimation method: PPML
RTA 0.337*** 0.347***
(0.034)*** (0.034)***
[0.046]*** [0.048]***
{0.052}*** {0.066}***
RTA lead -0.035
(0.021)*
[0.032]
{0.080}
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.452*** -0.472***
(0.041) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.409*** -0.431***
(0.043) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.472*** -0.494***
(0.037) (0.026)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.325*** -0.350***
(0.037) (0.026)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.227*** -0.226***
(0.029) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.159*** -0.158***
(0.015) (0.015)
Sanctions -0.088* -0.080
(0.038)** (0.042)*
[0.051]* [0.052]*
{0.069} {0.069}
Sanctions lead 0.037
(0.032)
[0.041]
{0.060}
N 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. The lead is three years. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way
clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.3: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FE estimation
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.213***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
RTA_LAG3 0.038 0.038 0.038
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
RTA_LAG6 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.204***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
RTA_LAG9 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.131***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.424*** -0.424*** -0.424***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.436*** -0.436*** -0.436***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.399***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.281*** -0.281*** -0.281***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.154***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Sanction type -0.057 -0.086 0.310
(0.146) (0.034)** (0.336)
[0.156] [0.037]** [0.359]
{0.140} {0.058} {0.182}
N 93828 93828 93828
within R2 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.4: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: FD estimation
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
D.RTA 0.053 0.053 0.053
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
D.RTA_LAG3 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
D.RTA_LAG6 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
D.RTA_LAG9 0.018 0.018 0.018
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
D.INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.728***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
D.INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.649*** -0.648*** -0.648***
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
D.INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.557*** -0.557*** -0.557***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
D.INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.372***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
D.INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.310***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
D.INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
D.sanction type -0.043 0.005 0.074
(0.139) (0.035) (0.296)
[0.143] [0.035] [0.310]
{0.075} {0.047} {0.220}
N 70826 70826 70826
within R2 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year and
exporter-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at
country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.5: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation (FE sample)
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.251***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
RTA_LAG3 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.137***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.027 0.029 0.028
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
RTA_LAG9 -0.022 -0.027 -0.022
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.377*** -0.398*** -0.377***
(0.049) (0.043) (0.049)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.380*** -0.400*** -0.379***
(0.047) (0.043) (0.047)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.465*** -0.479*** -0.465***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.322*** -0.330*** -0.322***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.215*** -0.219*** -0.215***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.154***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Sanction type -0.011 -0.084 -0.458
(0.057) (0.038)** (0.316)
[0.057] [0.050]* [0.388]
{0.039} {0.061} {0.501}
N 93828 93828 93828
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.6: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation (full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
lim. sanctions mod. sanctions ext. sanctions
RTA 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.267***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.051)
RTA_LAG3 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.139***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
RTA_LAG6 0.029 0.030 0.029
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
RTA_LAG9 -0.028 -0.033 -0.028
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.389*** -0.411*** -0.389***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.050)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.388*** -0.409*** -0.388***
(0.049) (0.044) (0.049)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.478*** -0.491*** -0.478***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.324*** -0.332*** -0.324***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.217*** -0.222*** -0.218***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.156***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Sanction type -0.021 -0.086 -0.212
(0.056) (0.038)** (0.309)
[0.063] [0.051]* [0.400]
{0.063} {0.051} {0.400}
N 132497 132497 132497
R2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year,
exporter-year, and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust, clustered at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.7: Trade eﬀects of economic sanctions by severity: PPML estimation (annual data)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sanctions Lim. sanctions Mod. sanctions Ext. sanctions
RTA 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.330***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.470*** -0.459*** -0.470*** -0.459***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1988 -0.446*** -0.436*** -0.446*** -0.436***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
INTL_BRDR_1989 -0.430*** -0.418*** -0.430*** -0.418***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.428*** -0.416*** -0.427*** -0.416***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
INTL_BRDR_1991 -0.447*** -0.436*** -0.447*** -0.436***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1992 -0.484*** -0.475*** -0.484*** -0.475***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.492*** -0.484*** -0.491*** -0.484***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1994 -0.434*** -0.426*** -0.434*** -0.426***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1995 -0.364*** -0.357*** -0.364*** -0.357***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.344*** -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.340***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
INTL_BRDR_1997 -0.285*** -0.280*** -0.285*** -0.280***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
INTL_BRDR_1998 -0.280*** -0.276*** -0.280*** -0.276***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.225*** -0.222*** -0.225*** -0.223***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
INTL_BRDR_2000 -0.093*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.090***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
INTL_BRDR_2001 -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.130***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.155***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
INTL_BRDR_2003 -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.144*** -0.143***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
INTL_BRDR_2004 -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.064***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Sanction type -0.055 -0.116 -0.054 -0.216
(0.020)*** (0.049)** (0.021)*** (0.157)
[0.037] [0.062]* [0.038] [0.314]
{0.042} {0.060}* {0.042} {0.131}*
N 379425 379425 379425 379425
R2 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
LHS for estimation methods: export value. All estimations include importer-year, exporter-year,
and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered at country pair
level, and multi-way clustered, respectively.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.8: Trade-diversion eﬀects of economic sanctions
(1) (2)
Estimation method: FE FD
Sanction 0.078 -0.065
(0.033)** (0.037)*
[0.038]** [0.039]*
{0.122} {0.216}
Trade diversion
of target
0.003 -0.004
(0.002)* (0.002)*
[0.002]* [0.002]*
{0.007} {0.005}
Trade diversion
of sender
0.006 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)
[0.002]*** [0.002]
{0.006} {0.005}
mrdis 52.525*** -34.226**
(14.419) (16.027)
mrborder -598.846*** 225.881*
(123.027) (135.274)
mrrta 67.920*** -15.583
(11.441) (13.928)
mrcntg 1197.672*** 233.236**
(96.464) (107.961)
mrlang -94.444** -75.458*
(42.925) (45.499)
mrclny -58.161 151.770*
(77.259) (77.694)
INTL_BRDR_1987 -0.540*** -0.767***
(0.063) (0.138)
INTL_BRDR_1990 -0.447*** -0.642***
(0.056) (0.110)
INTL_BRDR_1993 -0.506*** -0.562***
(0.052) (0.092)
INTL_BRDR_1996 -0.345*** -0.359***
(0.046) (0.072)
INTL_BRDR_1999 -0.255*** -0.276***
(0.037) (0.053)
INTL_BRDR_2002 -0.164*** -0.177***
(0.031) (0.034)
RTA 0.174*** 0.031
(0.034) (0.032)
RTA_LAG3 0.013 -0.007
(0.029) (0.028)
RTA_LAG6 0.093*** 0.086***
(0.030) (0.030)
RTA_LAG9 0.048 0.090***
(0.031) (0.034)
N 93869 70867
R2 0.883 0.028
Pair ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
Year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Sender, target ﬁxed eﬀects yes no
LHS variable: ln(export value). Controls for multilateral resistance follow
Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered
at country pair level, and multi-way clustered, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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